

Beyond Westphalia: The Emergent Globalization Paradigm

**A Monograph
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Abstract

BEYOND WESTPHALIA: THE EMERGENT GLOBALIZATION PARADIGM by MAJ Charles S. Armstrong, U.S. Army, 56 pages.

This monograph analyzes the effects of globalization on the international system as reflected in the changing nature of war. The difficulties that the United States leadership is having with creating and communicating a strategy for the Global War on Terror is indicative of inadequacies within the Westphalian Paradigm for conducting analysis and research of the international system. The driving force behind the shifting paradigm is globalization which is integrating and interconnecting people, thoughts, ideas, and technology around the world despite national boundaries. The United States Military's efforts to transform to meet emergent threats continues to use Westphalian Paradigm to conduct analysis and research despite indications that a paradigm shift, fueled by globalization, has occurred.

While there are numerous similarities between the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the attacks of 11 September 2001, the differences are more critical to understanding the drastic changes that have occurred over the past fifty years. An analysis of the differences between the two attacks highlights the differences between World War II and the Global War on Terror and the changes that globalization has caused on the international system in general.

Analyzing the traditional American concept of war shows that three aspects of war have undergone significant changes within the past fifty years. State-on-state war has become the anomaly with United States military forces conducting operations other than war more frequently than they have in the past. Further the rise of non-state actors in the form of terrorists continues to pose an enormous threat to United States interests around the globe. The increase in technology in the form of the internet and satellite news has allowed individuals from all over the world to become more connected, sharing ideas and information at a pace that is unrivaled in history while being able to influence perception and policy of other states. Finally, the objective of war has changed to include the security of global markets and humanitarian operations. The military continues to be deployed around the world to conduct operations that fall well short of full scale warfare. This trend is accompanied by a desire to decrease collateral damage to minimal levels and exclude the population from the effects of war.

The future of war is closely tied to globalization and the military will continue to conduct operations that are very different from wars against other nation-states. It is becoming more evident that the military is no longer able to protect the security of the nation from external threats. Rather it is the synergistic effect of the combined elements of national power that are required to win the nation's wars. The Global War on Terror is a new form of war that must be carefully analyzed and understood in order for the United States to successfully prosecute it. The Westphalian Paradigm is no longer capable of providing the mental model necessary to guide analysis and research. A closer examination of the emergent Globalization Paradigm is required to ensure that the United States is fully capable of transforming every element of national power to meet the threats.

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INTRODUCTION

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

On 1 May 2003, in the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush announced the “end of major combat operations” in Iraq.¹ This speech caused a lot of confusion throughout the nation because the citizenry of the United States was unclear what the President was actually attempting to communicate. Many Americans thought that the President was saying that the war in Iraq was over with a resounding victory for the coalition while others believed that the President was simply stating that Phase 3, Major Combat Operations, was complete and the war was now transitioning to Phase 4, Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Over the following months and years, this speech was cited as proof that President Bush and his administration were overly optimistic about Operation Iraqi Freedom. Analysts and news anchors continued to cite current military operations, violence, and American casualties as proof that the President did not have a clear idea of the actual situation in Iraq. This speech, and the subsequent media and political controversy that it caused, was a clear indicator that there are very disparate viewpoints on what constitutes war and where operations in Iraq fit within the spectrum of war, conflict, and peace.

As the violence and instability in Iraq continue, the United States government remains unable to sufficiently communicate the strategy to control the level of violence in the country and establish a stable government that can effectively rule the nation without large scale assistance

¹ President George W. Bush (remarks to the crew of the USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of San Diego, California, 1 May 2003), on-line at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/20203>, accessed 26 March 2006.

from other nations. There appear to be very divergent ideas on what the current “reality” in Iraq is and what the nature of the conflict in that country is developing into. Over the past three years the nature of the threat has been called terrorism, criminal activity, insurgency, sectarian violence, and a variety of alternate terms across the threat spectrum. In response to these disparate threats, the United States led coalition has conducted security and reconstruction operations, nation-building operations, counter-terrorist operations, counter-insurgency operations, and a myriad of other forms of operations designed to increase the stability and legitimacy of the constitutionally elected government of Iraq. The inability of elected officials, analysts, and others to accurately communicate events in Iraq explains much of the difficulty inherent in a campaign of this type where there are such varying views of what is actually taking place. Without a clear set of terms to communicate ideas and viewpoints, it is impossible to ensure that all of the actors involved are using the same framework to analyze the situation and find solutions to the problems.

The inability of the government to create, use, and communicate a mental framework for shared understanding of the problem in Iraq, as well as the Global War on Terror in general, is a result of not understanding severe changes that have occurred throughout the world within the past fifty years. The continuation of globalizing trends across all aspects of human interaction is the driving force behind this lack of a common mental framework. Without a sufficient mental framework, or paradigm, to drive analysis and research, it is impossible to even know the correct questions to ask leading to inadequate solutions of complex problems around the world.

The resounding defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War was the pinnacle of the Clausewitzian dictum that posits that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means”² as understood within the mental framework that developed as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia. The American conceptual understanding of war is based on the premise of two

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.

nation-states, or coalitions, in competition to “overthrow the enemy ...or merely to occupy some of his frontier districts.”³ The current and foreseeable future nature of war no longer reflects this American conceptual understanding; however it remains the only conceptual framework which drives analysis and understanding of the current phenomena of war.

The rise, and subsequent empowerment, of non-state actors using terrorism as their means of conducting war is an indicator that something fundamental within the current understanding of the international system has changed; causing a subsequent change in the nature of war for the foreseeable future. Recognizing that something fundamental has changed that does not fit within the conceptual understanding of the phenomena of war, the Army is currently transforming both its force structure and doctrine to ensure that it is able to meet the challenges to United States national interests in the future. As MG Chiarelli, the Commanding General of the First Cavalry Division noted while in Iraq, “although we train and are comfortable executing wide sweeps through the desert, warfare as we know it has changed.”⁴

The problem with Army transformation is that it continues to be based on a deep-rooted understanding of the paradigm that emerged as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia, or Westphalian Paradigm, without any analysis of the possibility of an emergent paradigm that could make this transformation irrelevant, or even worse, unable to provide the necessary security to the nation. The Westphalian Paradigm was based on European history and the rule sets (a set of rules based on history, cultural understanding, agreements, and treaties that are accepted within a given system) that were developed following the Treaty of Westphalia and subsequently enforced by the major European powers throughout the world during the colonial period. The crux of the problem facing the military, as it seeks to transform and remain relevant in the future, is that the

³ Ibid, 77.

⁴ Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review*, (July-August 2005): 17.

paradigm which governs human interaction throughout the world has changed, thus causing previous means of research and analysis which led to theories to become less capable of explaining and accounting for events around the world.

The fall of the Soviet Union finally allowed the United States and the rest of the ‘western’ nations, to broaden their viewpoint from an exclusively Europe-centric viewpoint to a more global one. For the first time in over 500 years, the control of Europe is no longer the central point of international competition and conflict between the major powers. The increased power of the media and the internet, other new technologies, the rise of non-state actors, the continued problem with nuclear weapon proliferation, the interconnected nature of economies, and the unipolar international system have all had profound changes on the international system resulting in a paradigm change. The difficulties that “Western” nations are having with understanding and influencing the international system are a clear sign that some fundamental changes in the international system have caused a shift toward something new and not clearly understood, and therefore not clearly defined.

The emerging paradigm, or Globalization Paradigm, is drastically different than the Westphalian Paradigm. “Globalization is not simply a trend or fad but is, rather, an international system” with its own “rules and logic that today directly or indirectly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and economics of virtually every country in the world.”⁵ In essence, globalization is a “movement toward markets or policies that transcend national borders.”⁶ The interconnected nature of the economies around the world drastically increases the opportunities for increased wealth. However, this interconnectedness also raises tensions and brings long-standing issues, such as ethnic tensions and economic deprivation, to the forefront. Ethnic

⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), ix.

⁶ Washington Council on International Trade, (Definition of terms in Glossary), on-line at <http://www.wcit.org/tradeis/glossary.htm>, accessed 26 March 2006.

violence, rampant disease, religious fanaticism, increased intra-state conflict, and a widening of the gap between the richest and poorest inhabitants of the world are some of the outcomes of the globalization process. Further, the increased availability of real-time information through numerous outlets highlights the conflicts and crises that are occurring throughout the world, resulting in a demand for action from the global citizenry. “At the core of the long-term process of change is a new ideational construct that values autonomy over compliance and interdependence over independence.”⁷

The purpose of this paper is to begin an analysis on the effects of globalization on the international system. In order to accurately analyze any changes in the nature of war or threats to the system, it is imperative that an established framework for analysis be developed. For, “if you can’t see the world, and you can’t see the interactions that are shaping the world, you surely cannot strategize about the world.”⁸ The specific area of analysis is the effects of globalization that have resulted in a drastic change in the nature and conduct of war. The American understanding of war provides the point of departure with which to analyze the changes that continue to transform the environment, conduct, and nature of war. “Studying the past has a way of inducing humility – a first stage toward gaining detachment – because it suggests the continuity of the problems we confront and the unoriginality of most of our solutions for them. It is a good way of putting things in perspective, of stepping back to take in a wider view.”⁹

This paper is divided into four distinct chapters. The first chapter defines the term paradigm as first established by Kuhn and provides insight into why paradigms play a large role in providing analysts with a framework to approach research and analysis within a system. This

⁷ James N. Rosenau, “Sovereignty in a Turbulent World,” in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 202.

⁸ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 232.

⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconstructions, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3.

approach is then compared with the idea of military revolutions and their impact on the conduct and nature of wars. The second chapter looks at the difference between two attacks that galvanized the nation to war: the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the attacks on September 11, 2001. Following an analysis of differences between these two attacks, the current Global War on Terrorism will be compared to World War II to establish critical differences between the two. The third chapter focuses on three aspects of the Westphalian paradigm that appear to be drastically changing, and therefore providing indicators that a paradigm change has occurred. These three aspects are state-on-state war, the impact of perception on the nature of war, and the application of violence to achieve objectives. After establishing that fundamental changes in the international system have led to the need for an emergent paradigm to govern analysis and research, the final chapter will begin to frame the emergent paradigm, or Globalization paradigm, to provide the reader with insights into what the future of competition and conflict may look like. This paper will not provide definitive solutions to the future problems that the United States will confront, nor will this paper discuss every aspect of globalization that is changing the nature of war such as internal demographics and investments that shape foreign policy and what constitutes “victory” in the future. Rather, the paper is designed to provoke thought and interest that will, in turn, begin to create a framework for understanding the emergent Globalization paradigm that is essential for governing research and analysis in the future.

The globalized nature of the world has drastically altered the definition of war, drastically expanding both the ways and means of executing war. War is no longer simply the application of military force and the exclusive domain of military formations. War now encompasses all aspects of human interaction to include economics, politics, religion, culture, and ideas all under a system that has drastically increased the speed with which information is shared around the

world. “Clearly, the framework that guided decisions and actions in the past is just that, past.”¹⁰ This paper will add to the discussions of the future of war and begin the process of providing a framework for analyzing war in the future. Without a new approach to the study of war as it applies to the globalized world of the twenty-first century, any attempt at transforming the military will be insufficient and possibly catastrophic to the interests of the United States.

PARADIGMS AND MILITARY REVOLUTIONS

Since the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the discussion has raged throughout the United States over the nature of the threat to national security. These discussions have revolved almost exclusively around three factors: the nature of transnational terrorist organizations, with Al Qaeda as the primary threat; the circumstances in failing states that allow these organizations to thrive; and the globalization systems that allow these organizations to act throughout the world. What these discussions lack is an overarching lens through which to analyze the disparate elements of the system that link all of the activities together in an extremely complex and interconnected system.

“The preparation for war demands, then, exercise of the imagination; we are compelled to make a mental excursion into the future.”¹¹ In order to begin an analysis on the future of war for the next three decades, the first requirement is to determine if the paradigm that governs research and analysis of human interaction in general has changed. While there are many different methods for analyzing and describing change within any system, the two that will be used and discussed in this paper are Kuhn’s analysis of paradigms and Knox and Murray’s analysis of military revolutions. Both of these methods have received a lot of attention throughout academic circles since their publication and are widely accepted methods of analysis.

¹⁰ James M. Dubik, “Get On with It,” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval University Press, 2005), 8.

¹¹ Giulio Douhet, “The Command of the Air,” in *Roots of Strategy: Book 4*, ed. David Jablonsky (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1999), 383.

Unfortunately, over the time since their first publication, the definitions of the key terms that are used have been warped. A brief discussion of Kuhn's ideas of paradigms and Knox and Murray's ideas of military revolutions is critical in order to fully understand the scope and nature of the changes that are currently becoming more evident in respect to international relations.

KUHNIAN PARADIGMS

In 1962, Thomas Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* which drastically altered the way that the scientific community viewed historical changes. Kuhn introduced the term paradigm to the scientific community and defined paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.”¹² A more useful definition of paradigm, provided by Peter Schwartz, is “the set of beliefs, axioms, assumptions, givens, or fundamentals that order and provide coherence to our picture of what is and how it works.”¹³ In Kuhn's argument, every scientific discipline operates under a unique paradigm that governs all research and understanding within that discipline. The paradigm is not reality; rather it is a mental construct that assists researchers with the ability to determine different problems and possible solutions to these problems. The paradigm is only valid because those who consider themselves practitioners of the given field operate within the framework established by the paradigm.

Kuhnian paradigms are not short-duration and minor course corrections within a given system of study and analysis. They are instead an overarching framework for analyzing data within a specified system. Paradigms provide the mental framework for analysis and research in a given field. “They are not the reality itself, but the directions we use to find our way across the

¹² Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), x.

¹³ Peter Schwartz, “The Emergent Paradigm,” *Analytical Report Values and Lifestyles Program*, (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Library, 1973), 28.

terrain.”¹⁴ It is impossible to conduct any research or inquiry into any scientific discipline without a paradigm, or theoretical framework, to guide thought. “In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant.”¹⁵ This poses serious problems for those who are concerned with transforming large organizations or institutions in response to changes in the environment.

Paradigm change, while containing elements that appear to change gradually over a period of time, tend to occur in a revolutionary fashion. When a paradigm is no longer able to provide the necessary framework for analysis and research, scientists “will devise numerous articulations and *ad hoc* modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any conflict.”¹⁶ Conflicts within paradigms must be corrected or the research is incapable of continuing. When conflict occurs within a given paradigm, either a solution for the conflict must be identified that remains within the framework of the previously established paradigm or a paradigm change must occur that accounts for all of the anomalies, thus allowing research to continue.

“The successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science.”¹⁷ The change is revolutionary because a new paradigm is never easily recognized or believed by any scientific community. The theoretical framework that furthers scientific thought and development in a given field is never easily replaced, no matter how much conflict appears within the established paradigm. “Perhaps the greatest stumbling block for revolutionaries has been that the human collective is not programmed to envision a lavishly different future; rather, we fear any future that is not largely

¹⁴ Schwartz, 28.

¹⁵ Kuhn, 15.

¹⁶ Ibid, 78.

¹⁷ Ibid, 12.

the same as the reality we know and have mastered.”¹⁸ A leap forward into an unrecognized and established paradigm is fraught with uncertainty and risk. For this reason, it is incredibly difficult to undergo a paradigm change in the social sciences where the inherent risks could be the very survival of a country, a people, or a way of life. For this reason, there have been relatively few paradigm changes throughout history. As stated before, paradigms are not easily replaced nor are they simply short-term solutions to conflict.

Regardless of the paradigm in question, the road to paradigm change occurs when there are tensions within the given discipline that the paradigm can no longer account for. Typical characteristics of a paradigm change are “the previous awareness of anomaly, the gradual and simultaneous emergence of both observational and conceptual recognition, and the consequent change of paradigm categories and procedures often accompanied by resistance.”¹⁹ Resistance to paradigm changes are inherent within every scientific discipline because it requires a drastic change in the way that elements within any system are seen, analyzed, and researched. After “the professional community has re-evaluated traditional experimental procedures, altered its conception of entities with which it has long been familiar, and in the process, shifted the network of theory through which it deals with the world,”²⁰ the emergent paradigm is able to act as the framework for further analysis and studies within a given discipline. “In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution, scientists are responding to a different world.”²¹

¹⁸ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2001), 203.

¹⁹ Kuhn, 62.

²⁰ Ibid, 7.

²¹ Ibid, 111.

KNOX AND MURRAY'S MILITARY REVOLUTION

Currently, the Army is using the idea of military revolutions to analyze their efforts at transforming. This idea was created by Knox and Murray in their 2001 publication of *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050*. This book is one of the primary readings and instructional tool used by the United States Army at its Command and General Staff College where Majors are introduced to the dynamics that cause change and subsequent transformation within militaries throughout history. There is a litany of publications, articles, and debates that center on this concept in an attempt to determine whether the military is witnessing a military revolution, or a smaller shift in the application of past activities on the nature of war.

Knox and Murray posit that the “defining feature” of a military revolution “is that it fundamentally changes the framework of war.”²² The focus of this analytical approach is on the preparation for and conduct of wars by nation-states operating within major force on force conflicts. The revolutions discussed by Knox and Murray are therefore centered on technological and social factors that changed the framework of war, and not on the paradigm itself that governs the interaction between individuals, collectives, and nation-states within the international system. The other characteristic of this analytical approach is that it establishes the ability to wage successful war as the driving factor behind changes within societies and the state. In Knox and Murray’s opinion, “Military Revolutions recast society and the state as well as military organizations.”²³ While this statement appears to include other factors into the approach, the approach remains militarily focused with the society and state adapting to increase the capabilities of the military.

²² Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray, ed., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6.

²³ Ibid, 7.

Knox and Murray's approach works incredibly well at establishing and documenting changes in society, technology, and military formations; and the effect that these changes have on the conduct of European wars from the 1300s to the 1990s. However, all of the military revolutions discussed by Knox and Murray occurred within the Westphalian paradigm as understood and accepted by the analysts and practitioners of the system. These military revolutions were large alterations in the conduct of war, but none of them fundamentally altered the paradigm in which war is considered and conducted. "A true revolution goes beyond that to change the game itself, including the rules, its equipment, the size and organization of the "teams", their training, doctrine, tactics, and just about everything else. It does this not in one "team" but in many simultaneously. Even more important, it changes the relationship of the game to society itself."²⁴ This statement is more closely aligned with the revolutionary nature of a paradigm change than with the idea of a Military Revolution.

TENSION POINTS

The international system received a shock on September 11, 2001 with the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. For the first time in sixty years, the United States homeland had been attacked with extensive loss of life. Much like the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 served as a call to arms for the United States. Soon after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States began conducting military operations against Al Qaeda and those who support terrorism in general named the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Both of these attacks resulted in the United States projecting military force to secure the nation. However the differences in these attacks are causing the nature of the associated wars to be radically different. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a classic shaping operation designed to destroy the primary military threat to

²⁴ Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, (New York: Warner Books, 1993), 32.

Japanese military operations in the Pacific Ocean. The attacks of 11 September do not fit well with classical military operations as there was no military force prepared to exploit any advantages gained from the attack. A closer examination of the two attacks will provide some insight into the changes that globalization has caused on the relationship between peoples around the world.

THE UNITED STATES ATTACKED: PEARL HARBOR AND 9/11

While the similarities between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks appeared on every media outlet across the nation, a careful analysis of the difference between the attacks did not appear to take place. Rather than asking the important questions concerning what was different between the two attacks, the United States appeared to look more closely at the similarities between the two events that would shape their respective generation of Americans. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were indicative of a fundamental shift in the very nature of war throughout the world. The attacks on 11 September were not conducted by a nation-state, but instead by a transnational terrorist network who called themselves Al Qaeda. Further, the ideas and operations of the Al Qaeda network appeared to be embodied in one super-empowered individual: Osama bin Laden. The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was an incredibly sophisticated operation; the type of operation that before this point in history could only have been planned and conducted by a nation-state. The attack against the United States proved the level of sophistication that non-state actors could accomplish in operations around the world.

Another critical difference between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks on 11 September concerns the nature of the target attacked. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a preemptive strike against a military target to set the conditions for continued operations in the Pacific. The terrorist attacks on the other hand, were carried out against civilian targets for the express purpose of proving that the global superpower could be attacked directly, to create

fear in the population in an attempt to gain desired political ends in the Middle East, and to cause an economic decline throughout the United States and therefore, the world. The change from a military target, or civilian targets that support a wartime industrial base, to a civilian economic center is a radical departure from any previous use of violence in the past, and an indicator that something larger has changed; namely the paradigm that governs the interaction between peoples.

While both of these attacks served to galvanize the population of the United States to go to war against those responsible, in the case of the September 11th attacks there was no nation-state to declare war against. Instead, there was a tactic, namely terrorism, and a loosely grouped collection of individuals known collectively as Al Qaeda. Japan was a tangible and easily identified threat; international terrorism and Al Qaeda are not as easily identified, understood, and attacked. The lack of a single nation-state to hold accountable for the attack drastically altered the nature of the GWOT.

THE WARS THAT ANSWERED THE ATTACKS

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor caused the United States to declare war on both the Japanese and the Germans. The introduction of new technologies to the battlefield altered the nature of World War II. Advances in air-craft technology, radio communications, radar, naval technology, motorized forces, mechanized forces and numerous others culminating in the creation of the atomic bomb drastically altered the speed and destruction of military forces. Further, these new technologies caused the introduction of new theories of war that captured their use on the battlefield. These new theories introduced war to the entire citizenry of the combatant nations by making them justifiable targets. The indiscriminate bombing of population centers was employed in an effort to attack the will of the population of a given nation, causing the citizenry to force their leadership to end hostilities. While numerous attacks of this type occurred, the resultant demand from the citizenry did not.

The advances in aeronautical technology further allowed belligerents to attack the wartime industrial complexes in an attempt to destroy weapons manufacturing and military supplies before they could be used to further prosecute the war effort. While the advanced aircraft could physically reach these complexes and attack them through aerial bombardment, the technology did not allow for precision in the bombing effort. As a result, these attacks resulted in the indiscriminate destruction of population centers as well as the industrial complexes. This served to galvanize the entire citizenry of every belligerent nation into supporting the war effort because they could easily see the threat that was posed to their survival.

Images of the war were displayed in movie theaters, newspapers, and in magazines. While this information tended to be dated due to the long time that it took to physically transport the images, the average American could witness images of the war. Accompanying these images were stories and commentary from those who were either participating in the combat, or witnessing the operations as they were conducted. These war correspondences were able to give American citizens a better feel for how operations were unfolding in both the European and Pacific theaters of the war. This further galvanized the nation in support of the war effort increasing the population's willingness to suffer hardship in support of their country.

Finally, with a clear cut enemy to fight, the United States government was able to turn over the planning and execution of the war to members of the military to carry out to successful completion. The objective of the war was the unconditional surrender of America's enemies through the destruction of their capacity to wage war; their military formations. The War Department received guidance from the national leadership, but did not require the assistance of other governmental agencies to win the war. Instead, the War Department was empowered to prosecute the war through whatever means necessary to accomplish the political objectives of the nation.

The GWOT on the other hand is completely different from any other war in which the United States has been involved. As stated earlier, the attacks of September 11, 2001 were not

carried out by another government in pursuit of their political goals. Instead, they were carried out by a transnational terrorist organization under the direction of a single, super-empowered individual. Therefore, declaring war on those who conduct or assist with terrorist activities is enormously more problematic than doing so against another nation-state. The United States is not fighting another uniformed military, but rather a loosely organized at best idea whose followers blend in well with their populations. This makes it incredibly difficult to find them and destroy them.

Once a terrorist organization is found, the problem becomes determining the best means to destroy them. Terrorist organizations do not belong to a single nation and are not necessarily citizens of the country where they are hiding, training, or planning operations. As a result, the United States is forced to justify military operations within the territory of another sovereign nation. This poses enormous challenges and risks, thus hindering the United States' ability to quickly act on intelligence and conduct operations against terrorists. The nature of the enemy forces the United States to operate more within countries rather than against them. "Widespread intra-state conflict is not a new phenomenon. Its rise to the centre of attention international policy circles is."²⁵ This is another drastic difference between the current war and any other war that the United States has been involved in.

Further, the average American citizen is not actively involved in any aspect of any of the operations in support of the GWOT in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the rest of the world. The threat to the security of the United States is not imminent; rather it is an ephemeral threat that may happen some time in the future and not throughout the country. The average American does not feel threatened because, unlike World War II, there is no visibly threat to their person, livelihood, or nation despite the fact that the threat is actually much larger than during World War II. United

²⁵ Esraf Aksu, *The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2003), 1.

States actions to counter the threat of terrorist attacks are cloaked in secrecy, with most incidents remaining top-secret. As a result, the average American is not aware of the effort that the government is taking to ensure the security of the nation.

The difficulty inherent with fighting an idea and non-state organizations becomes increasingly more difficult as the nation attempts to determine a strategy to win this war. There is no enemy nation to negotiate with, no national population to attack, and no military force to defeat on the battlefield. As a result, defining the desired end-state and developing a strategy to accomplish the political objectives becomes incredibly difficult to do. Further, explaining the scope and nature of the threat and the established strategy to secure the nation and defeat the threat is difficult at best. Even defining the type of war is difficult. “Emergency conditions, small wars, police actions, constabulary missions, stability operations, peacetime contingencies, low –intensity conflict, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement – the struggle to name this ambitious yet lethal phenomenon very much reflects its inherent frustrations.”²⁶ The words that we choose to describe an activity are responsible for giving real meaning to the terms being used. The inability to even determine a label for the type of war that we are currently involved in shows those responsible for explaining current operations are not really sure what exactly they are labeling.²⁷

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF AN UNIPOLAR WORLD

During the Cold War, the international system was defined by the relationship between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In most respects, each side was the polar opposite of the other. As a result of this tension, the world was defined as bipolar, with each side dominating a specific sphere of influence based on the political structure and economic

²⁶ Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1995), 37.

²⁷ Bolger, 67.

systems of the particular nation-states in their sphere. “The Cold War had its own rules: in foreign affairs, neither superpower would encroach on the other’s sphere of influence; in economics, less developed countries would focus on nurturing their own national industries, developing countries on export-led growth, communist countries on autarky and Western economies on regulated trade.”²⁸ The disintegration of the Soviet Union created a radically different international system, now defined as unipolar, with the United States as the only remaining superpower. As the global hegemon, the United States must take the lead in the international community to create a new international political system that reflects the unipolar nature of the world. “Without a benevolent hegemon to guarantee order, the international scene can degenerate quickly into chaos and worse.”²⁹

Further, the demise of the Soviet Union proved that the economic system best suited for continuous growth and prosperity was the capitalist system. This economic system, coupled with democratic governments, proved to be more resilient and adaptable to changes within the international system. As a result, the populations of countries that were previously under the communist yoke began the process of integration with the European Union who linked economic integration with democratization. All of these actions contributed to the creation of a new economic rule set that would evolve into what is currently known as globalization.

“Globalization is not simply a trend or fad but is, rather, an international system” with its own “rules and logic that today directly or indirectly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and economics of virtually every country in the world.”³⁰

²⁸ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 7.

²⁹ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 350.

³⁰ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, ix.

A NEW LENS FOR HUMAN INTERACTION

CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF PARADIGM CHANGE

The globalized nature of the world has drastically altered the definition of war; drastically expanding both the ways and means of executing war. War is no longer simply the application of military force and the exclusive domain of military formations. War now encompasses all aspects of human interaction to include economics, politics, religion, culture, and ideas all under a system that has drastically increased the speed with which information is shared around the world. The fall of the Soviet Union coupled with the increase in globalization has drastically altered the framework of war. The first step in analyzing war is to create a framework for analyzing the ways that wars are fought in this interconnected world. As Clausewitz notes, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”³¹

It is impossible to begin a discussion or analysis of emerging factors within a new paradigm without looking for points of departure from the accepted analytical models. An analysis of three major components of the American conceptual understanding of war will add insight into a few of the critical factors of war that have changed as a result of the change of paradigms between the Westphalian Paradigm and the Globalization Paradigm. These major components are state on state war, Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, and violence and objective. Each of these components is a key pillars upon which stand the American conceptual understanding of war.

³¹ Clausewitz, 100.

STATE ON STATE WAR

The American concept of war presupposes that conflicts will occur between two nation-states with similar military capabilities. This is the critical factor that continues to pose severe restrictions on the ability of political leaders to adequately inform the citizenry on the nature of the GWOT. This fact raises a problem when this conceptual understanding of war is applied to the current situation around the world where the threat comes not from a peer competitor, but instead from failed states and super-empowered individuals. “Many different organizations fight wars, whether those organizations be tribes, petty principalities, empires, nations, or street gangs.”³² Globalization has drastically altered the interaction between nation-states, their citizenry, and the citizenry of the entire world. The effect of the international media on the actions of a state, which will be discussed later in this paper, has drastically constrained the wielding of power around the globe. “Nation-states, and the American superpower in particular, are still hugely important today, but so too now are Supermarkets and Super-empowered individuals.”³³ Neither of these elements is accounted for within the Westphalian Paradigm, causing severe difficulties for western government to analyze and account for them in the future.

The very nature of the nation-state has been altered by the increased interconnectedness that is driven by globalization. “One of the major consequences of globalization has been a deterioration of the power of the state.”³⁴ This deterioration of the power of the state can be seen within the monopoly of violence previously held by states, the rule sets that govern the use of violence, and the rise of non-state actors and super-empowered individuals. The shift in the monopoly of violence, constraints on the use of violence, and the actors involved is clearly shown by the events of September 11, 2001, as well as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

³² Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments for Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman, 2000), 69.

³³ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 14.

³⁴ Matthew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism,” *Parameters*, (Spring 2004): 37.

In the Westphalian paradigm, the threat of war was the sole province of nation-states that followed certain rules for the application of violence. Without the monopoly on the use of force held by states, the environment becomes more like anarchy with no rule set governing the actions of individuals.³⁵ The nature of the threats in the future will not necessarily follow along the same lines as those threats in the past. “The rise of non-state threats is a tremendous problem for Western governments and militaries, because we are legally and behaviorally prepared to fight only other legal-basis states – mirror images of ourselves – at a time when state power and substance are declining worldwide.”³⁶ The rupture of the Soviet Union directly impacted the proliferation of weapons across the globe. The component states of the Soviet Union sold weapons and armament following their liberation to almost any buyer because they needed the money to support their fledgling governments. This allowed terrorist networks and failing states to arm themselves at a much lower cost without any accountability on the use of the weapons. “This de-massification of the advanced economies is paralleled by a de-massification of threats in the world, as a single giant threat of war between superpowers is replaced by a multitude of ‘niche threats’”.³⁷

The current threat to the United States is exemplified by non-state actors who use terrorism and low-technology forms of warfare to counter the overwhelming and technologically advanced military of the United States. “They [individuals who fear globalization] fear that by joining this modern – or ‘Western’ – system of rules, their traditional society will be forever damaged and ultimately perverted. They are willing to wage warfare against individuals, states, and even the system itself to prevent that outcome.”³⁸ These individuals are fighting a war for

³⁵ Waltz, 70.

³⁶ Peters, 10.

³⁷ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 104.

³⁸ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 83.

their very existence, a war where there are no rules or limitations because failure results in the complete loss of their culture and civilization. “One of the critical lessons of 11 September is that terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, do not operate under the same constraints as nation-states.”³⁹ In the emerging paradigm, the rule set that governs the application of violence is not clearly articulated or observed by the actors involved in the decision. Further, the monopoly of violence is no longer held by states that could be held accountable by the international community for the use of violence on other states. The primary threat established to the United States, as defined by the President of the United States, comes from al Qaeda and other associated terrorist groups. The problem with this threat is that “Al Qaeda is a free floating nihilism, not a nation, or even a network.”⁴⁰

The impact of the rise of non-state actors and super-empowered individuals on the previous paradigm is that western states are no longer capable of countering the threat posed from these individuals. Our entire political system is based on interactions with other states, with an articulated and understood rule set that governs the application of violence. A further problem with the changing of paradigms occurs because many analysts believe that the anomaly is the current threat and not the chance of large scale state on state war, which over the past fifty years has in fact, been the anomaly. “The end of state versus state conflict as the dominating factor of ‘war’ has failed to register in transformation to the extent that military forces are still largely configured to fight major wars against like and symmetrical threats.”⁴¹

³⁹ Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities,” *Parameters*, (Summer 2002), 45.

⁴⁰ James Carroll, *Boston Globe* (Boston), 30 January 2006.

⁴¹ Harlan Ullman, “On War: Enduring Principles or Profound Changes?” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval University Press, 2005), 84.

THE INCREASED IMPACT OF PERCEPTION ON WAR

Another aspect of Clausewitz's theory of war that has received a lot of attention since it was first penned in the 1800s is the paradoxical trinity. The power of the people which was harnessed by Napoleon following the French Revolution was a new aspect of war that until Napoleon's campaigns was not seen before. Prior to this time, war did not involve most of the citizenry of a state. The ruler would raise an Army for a period of time to conduct operations and then disband them. The officers were members of the nobility and the soldiery was constituted from the dregs of society. The French Revolution unleashed the potential power of a citizen army officered by members of its own class who were promoted based off of their abilities as a soldier. This allowed Napoleon to conduct more far-reaching military operations than any other ruler up to his time. The impact of this force was not lost on Clausewitz who described the influence of the three forces that played on war in his paradoxical trinity.

“As a total phenomenon its [war] dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”⁴² Clausewitz then further explains that the “The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.”⁴³ Clausewitz uses the paradoxical trinity to show the different forces that pull on war to shape the way that specific operations are conducted. In his paradigm, the three forces described above were the only forces that directly shaped war.

As discussed earlier in this paper, war and violence are no longer solely controlled by states. Current events show that violence continues to be conducted by non-state actors in the

⁴² Clausewitz, 101.

⁴³ Ibid, 101.

form of terrorist networks which is not acceptably framed within the Westphalian Paradigm. “It follows that, where there are not states, the threefold division into government, army, and people does not exist in the same form. Nor would it be correct to say that, in such societies, war is made by governments using armies for making war at the expense of, or on behalf of, their people.”⁴⁴ The inclusion of non-state actors into the realm of the use of violence has had drastic effects on the trinity as espoused by Clausewitz. Something additional is exerting force on the shape of war that was not present when Clausewitz wrote his theory; perception.

There are many critics who believe that trinity warfare as defined by Clausewitz has been replaced by a new trinity. Ralph Peters argues that the Clausewitzian trinity “is being replaced by a powerful new trinity: the relationship between the state, people, and information.”⁴⁵ This argument takes into account the rise of information and the media and removes the military from the equation. While this argument does an excellent job of highlighting the impact of information on the shape of war in the future, the argument that military formations will not be a primary shaper of war in the future is untenable.

Information is a critical factor that determines the shape of current conflicts and will continue to shape war in the future. While information is a critical component, the term is not adequate enough to explain the forces that are at work within the globalized world where information can be immediately accessed and acted upon.

The United States is discovering in Iraq and Afghanistan that perception is as critical an element to the shape of war as those developed by Clausewitz. Perception encompasses every element that contributes to the way that friendly, neutral, and adversarial elements see the conflict. These elements include the media, culture, information, religion, and language. There is a reason that almost every protest, regardless of the country where it is taking place, has people

⁴⁴ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 50.

⁴⁵ Peters, 153.

holding signs written in English. These signs are not for the local inhabitants, they are for the inhabitants of the world who are witnessing the protest on the news, covered by reporters speaking their language and interpreting the event for their specific culture. As MG Chiarelli noted in an article about the First Cavalry Division's operations in Baghdad, "a significant reality of the task force campaign is that it is fought on the local, national, and international stages."⁴⁶ War is no longer conducted at distances where the citizenry is not able to see and feel what is happening on the battlefield. "Images once reserved only for soldiers are now shown back home to the public, including family members. This has an undermining effect on foreign operations, because casualties taken by either side in a conflict may shift public opinion, potentially resulting in the termination of operations."⁴⁷ The introduction of the internet, satellite communications, and worldwide news coverage has changed the relationship between those who execute war and those who are asked to support the war effort.

"The people thinking hardest about warfare in the future know that some of the most important combat of tomorrow will take place on the media battlefield."⁴⁸ The United States' efforts to gain the support of the international community through the United Nations for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq prove that information is a critical aspect to the introduction of violence. "Legitimacy – the perceived legality and morality of war aims and operations conducted in pursuit of them – has become more important in the globalized environment of the twenty-first century where political statements and physical actions can be captured and retransmitted almost instantly."⁴⁹ The instantaneous nature of information allows the world

⁴⁶ Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, (July-August 2005): 14.

⁴⁷ Robert J. Bunker, "Technology in a Neo-Clausewitzian Setting," in *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy*, ed. Gert de Nooy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 141.

⁴⁸ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 194.

⁴⁹ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Principles of War or Principles of Battle?" in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval University Press, 2005), 69.

community to quickly determine if the United States is in fact practicing what it preaches in the conduct of operations around the world.

More importantly, our adversaries fully understand the impact of information operations on the conduct of war. “Arab media may in fact be aiding the insurgency. Reports of staggering numbers of new Iraqi satellite television dishes suggest that foreign media broadcasts, many of them colored with anti-American bias are competing with Coalition media services in the battle to shape Iraqi perceptions.”⁵⁰ The United States stands as a global pillar for the right for every person to maintain freedom of speech. As a result, we cannot target adversary news agencies and treat them as hostile entities. Instead, it becomes imperative that the United States embraces the different news outlets and enters the debate for better understanding of her intent towards other peoples and nations in the international community.

In the new paradigm, information is a weapon of war that must be wielded with the same thought as kinetic weapons are. “Precision-targeting information is just as important as precision-targeting weapons, and the new media will make this possible to an unprecedented degree.”⁵¹ The Abu Ghraib scandal and other scandals that have plagued the United States reconstruction and nation building effort in Iraq are clear examples of the effect that information has on the conduct of operations. These scandals provide the adversary with clear examples of the United States not conducting operations and treating people in the manner that they say that they do. These scandals continue to plague the United States’ efforts in Iraq because they are not handled correctly and countered on the international stage.

The effects of information on the Globalization Paradigm are astounding. “Printing made us all readers. Xeroxing made us all publishers. Television made us all viewers. Digitization

⁵⁰ Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” *Parameters*, (Spring 2004): 22.

⁵¹ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 201.

makes us all broadcasters.”⁵² The introduction of new technologies that are cheaper and easier to operate leveled the playing field for every state, group, and individual to introduce their opinions to the argument. The ability for information from every nation, society, or group to be broadcast to the rest of the world has allowed the international citizenry to have more impact on the decisions to act or not act in given areas. “Social awareness of people everywhere has been heightened by television reports appearing on CNN and other networks. When conflicts within a country result in the massacre of innocents or starvation, especially of children, human sympathy swells and demands intensify to alleviate the conditions which brought on the killings and the hunger.”⁵³ The decision makers no longer have a monopoly on information. The citizenry now has the ability to use information to gain support for actions that they think should be taken from the government. As a result, the probability that the United States will continue to send military forces, money, and other resources to assist with beleaguered peoples is continuing to increase.

This directly affects the posture that the United States must maintain to be prepared to conduct disparate operations throughout the world. “The Cable News Network (CNN) is not just a purveyor of information but a setter of political agendas.”⁵⁴ The United States government must be able to meet the requirements that her citizenry places on the use of every element of national power in the future.

The current efforts by military forces in Iraq to use the media are beginning to show some signs of success. Standing up an Iraqi Army and Security Force is necessary, but ensuring the international community that these forces are prepared to operate on their own is critical. “The Public Order Division also followed up the raid with preplanned media events designed to

⁵² Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 50.

⁵³ Bevin Alexander, *The Future of Warfare*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 31.

⁵⁴ Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty and Intervention,” in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 230.

demonstrate their competence and to assure the Iraqi people that the Special Police were there to protect them from the insurgents.”⁵⁵ Gaining support for the legitimacy of both the government and her forces is critical to the establishment of a viable government in Iraq that can weather the future attacks that are going to occur.

Finally, the rationale that the United States used in entering into war with Iraq proved false causing many debates and discussions that continue to hamper operations. The case for invasion revolved around Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and his willingness to use them or allow terrorists access to them. Invading coalition forces were unable to find any weapons of mass destruction both during combat operations and reconstruction operations despite serious efforts to do so. In the aftermath of this failure, the United States has not adequately explained to both its citizenry and the citizenry of the world what the goals of operations in Iraq are. “Until the Bush Administration describes that future worth creating in terms ordinary people and the rest of the world can understand, we will continue to lose support at home and abroad for the great task that lies ahead.”⁵⁶ A clear articulation of the United States’ goals in Iraq are not sufficient to garner the support necessary to see the operation through to successful completion. The leadership of the United States must articulate our new rule sets and sell them to the international community or the United States will lose credibility as a superpower and our rule sets will be dismissed as simply American bias.”⁵⁷

The force of perception on the shape of war is a recent phenomenon that is having an enormous impact on operations currently being conducted by the United States. While perception has always been an element of operations abroad, the introduction of real-time media outlets has made perception a critical element of every interaction between the United States and the

⁵⁵ COL James K. Greer, “Operation Knockout: COIN in Iraq,” *Military Review*, (November-December 2005): 18.

⁵⁶ Barnett, 169.

⁵⁷ Barnett, 57.

international community. This addition is not insignificant. Rather, the inclusion of perception is further proof that we are operating in a completely different paradigm than we were twenty years ago.

VIOLENCE AND OBJECTIVE

No aspect of war has changed so thoroughly under the new paradigm than the use of violence and the objective of the campaign. This fact is eloquently captured in a statement by MG Chiarelli, “synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace.”⁵⁸ The objective of war during Clausewitz’s time was to “overthrow the enemy ...or merely to occupy some of his frontier districts.”⁵⁹ This simple statement is no longer sufficient to describe the objective of war as it applies to both current and future applications of power. The goal of military operations, which are only a small piece of overall operations currently conducted by the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is to provide the security for local leaders to create and operate their governmental institutions.

The Clausewitzian dictum “that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”⁶⁰ continues to remain relevant in the Globalization Paradigm. But since this is the case, “the realization that all military activity is subordinate to political intent, and must be attuned accordingly: mere destruction of the enemy is not the answer.”⁶¹ This is the critical change between the two paradigms as they pertain to the use of violence and the objective of war. Through the middle part of the 1900s war continued to become more and more violent and come closer and closer to

⁵⁸ Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review*, (July-August 2005): 4.

⁵⁹ Clausewitz, 77.

⁶⁰ Clausewitz, 99.

⁶¹ Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” *Military Review*, (November-December 2005): 14.

reaching the idea of total war as defined by Clausewitz. However, the introduction of nuclear weapons to the world in 1945 changed this aspect of modern war.

The destruction unleashed by the twin atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima had a profound effect on the international community. Even though the total number of dead produced by the fire bombing of Dresden and Tokyo surpassed those of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the fact that two bombs produced that much devastation caused the political leadership to reevaluate the methods of waging war in the future. Once the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons of its own in 1949 the thought of using nuclear weapons became more appalling. The advent of second strike capabilities ushered in the era of mutually assured destruction where both the Soviet Union and the United States realized that any use of nuclear weapons would result in the complete destruction of the other party and possibly the world. This resulted in neither the United States nor the Soviet Union being willing to confront each other in open hostilities for fear of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Although neither side knew it at the time, this drastically decreased the probability of major state on state warfare.

Although war continues to have some elements that are incredibly violent, “war is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy.”⁶² The current trend in the application of violence is toward more bloodless wars with the United States maintaining a military that has incredible overmatch in capabilities compared to every other nation on the face of the planet. This has resulted in the military becoming “a victim of its own successful development as the ultimate warfighting machine.”⁶³ As stated earlier in this paper, the United States success in conventional warfighting has caused her adversaries to resort to terrorist tactics and low-end forms of warfare. But the citizenry of the United States does not want to cause the complete destruction of her enemies.

⁶² Clausewitz, 98.

⁶³ Aylwin-Foster, 14.

Instead, “unlike more traditional conquerors, we are not content merely to subdue others: We insist that they be like us.”⁶⁴

The objective of the American way of war has changed from the past and is now more oriented toward increasing international stability, creating democratic institutions, enforcing fundamental human rights, and providing access to international trade and business throughout the world. “Americans hope for a world of stability and predictability, a world of order. Citizens abroad and American corporations function best in an environment of peace and prosperity. Stability, then, has become the overall goal for American foreign policy.”⁶⁵

“Violence is not synonymous with war, and it was only later that conflict took on the true character of war as such – a bloody clash between organized states.”⁶⁶ In its essence war is a clash between two competitors who are attempting to enforce their will on the other. This clash can be a violent war, a heated argument, or a test of wills. Warfare in the future will be less about two armies fighting to complete the destruction of the other and more about harnessing every aspect of national power to the attainment of the desired outcome of the conflict. “In the era the writers were discussing [Clausewitz and Jomini], the defeat of the army and surrender of the capital usually led directly to the surrender of the government. Unfortunately, what we have seen in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq, this is no longer the case.”⁶⁷ The objective of wars in the future will revolve more around securing economic interests and less about securing the nation from external threats of annihilation from near-peer competitors.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 384.

⁶⁵ Bolger, 73.

⁶⁶ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 35.

⁶⁷ Thomas X. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare,” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval University Press, 2005), 267.

⁶⁸ Peters, 94.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE WESTPHALIAN PARADIGM




Figure 1: The Westphalian Paradigm's Concept of War and Peace

The traditional understanding of the relationship between war and peace in the Westphalian paradigm occurred along one central axis as shown in Figure 1. Every interaction between states occurred along the political spectrum with peace at one end and total war at the other end. “The American way of war is marked by a belief that the nation is at war or at peace; the binary nature of war leaves no space for political-military interface.”⁶⁹ Political discourse and other elements of national power are used to attempt to force your will on your opponent. When these options are no longer able to accomplish the objectives that the political leadership desires, military action is taken to accomplish the objective. Once military action begins, the state is fundamentally at war. The only question remaining is what level of war the state is in.

Historically there are a number of terms that define the level of war that the state is conducting. These terms include low-intensity conflict, small wars, operations other than war, total war, as well as a multitude of other terms with associated definitions. These terms are used to explain to the citizenry exactly how much of the national treasure will be used in order to successfully accomplish the objectives of the war. Once the war is successfully accomplished, the state is no longer at war and once again moves down the political spectrum towards peace.

⁶⁹ LTC John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (New York: Praeger, 2002), 43.

GLOBALIZATION PARADIGM

Having discussed what a paradigm is and some of the points of tension that have led to the adoption of a new paradigm to frame analysis and research in the social sciences, a closer examination of what the future paradigm will look like is necessary. As with any theoretical work, the purpose of this new paradigm is to cause thought and debate about the future nature of the world. This paper is focused on the effects of globalization on the Westphalian Paradigm and more specifically on the effects of globalization on war. The following is a more in depth analysis on what the future face of war may look like over the next three decades.

DEFINITION OF FUTURE WAR

As alluded to earlier in this paper, there are many different definitions of war that are used to describe the level of violence, national treasure, and effort to be expended to attain the political objective. Each of these definitions carries a certain degree of bias and baggage that make them difficult to apply to the current and future environment. Clausewitz defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”⁷⁰ In the subsequent chapters of his work, Clausewitz described the use of force primarily in terms of violence between two opposing armies each with the objective of destroying the other. This is the aspect of war that has changed, namely the definition of the term force.

The definition of the term war, and the subsequent definition of force, is tied closely to the nature of globalization itself. The impact of globalization on war, and war on globalization, is “a transformation of military power that can only be understood as we uncover...the remarkable parallels between the emerging economy of the future and the fast-changing nature of war itself, each accelerating change in the other.”⁷¹ This tends to lead to a less violent definition of war

⁷⁰ Clausewitz, 83.

⁷¹ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 9.

where the term conflict becomes more appropriate. But removing violence from the definition of war would be at odds with a deeply rooted understanding of a central pillar of the Westphalian Paradigm. “Let’s not kid ourselves, most of the rule-set changes proposed since 9/11 focus on war and the military management of ‘empire’. But that just reflects our habit of thinking about war solely within the context of war instead of approaching war as something that occurs within the context of everything else.”⁷² This statement from Thomas Barnett posits that in order to understand the future of warfare, an analysis of the “everything else” must be accomplished first.

“Traditionally, war has involved military operations between states or between a state and an insurgent enemy for ultimate control of that state. In both cases the primary medium for war has been combat between fielded military forces, be they regular (state) or irregular (non-state) forces.”⁷³ This traditionally view of war does not appear to remain as relevant to the future given the previous discussions on elements that have changed. The current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not between fielded military forces. They are between a fielded force and terrorist groups that want to continue the level of instability in the region. Although the term insurgent is used to describe many of these forces, this term attributes a higher level of organization and strategy to the groups than they rightfully deserve. This shows that some of the aspects of the traditional definition of war are not apropos to the current paradigm.

The Marine Corps defines war as “a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. These groups have traditionally been established nation-states, but they may also include any non-state group with its own political interests and the ability to generate organized violence on a scale sufficient to have significant

⁷² Barnett, 53.

⁷³ Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism: The Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003), 2-3.

political consequences.”⁷⁴ This definition includes the non-state groups but runs afoul of requiring that war is characterized by the use of military force. While the use of military formations was the primary means of conducting war in the past, this no longer appears to be the case currently or in the future. The United States Military is not having any difficulties fighting the enemy in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is the inability of the other elements of national power to assist, or in many respects take the lead, that is causing difficulties in those areas. The statement that is commonly made in the media and around Washington D.C. that the interagency system is broken is categorically false. The interagency system is operating as efficiently and effectively as it was created to do. The problem is that the interagency system is no longer valid for the requirements necessary to operate within the Globalization Paradigm.

Joint Publication 3-0 *Conducting Joint Operations* defines war as “when the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in wartime state”⁷⁵ This definition fits in well with the binary nature of war as understood in the Westphalian Paradigm. Unfortunately, it does not account for the synergy that must occur between every element of national power to successfully accomplish political objectives. This definition also falls into the trap of making war and major combat operations synonymous. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly indicate that this is in fact not the case.


In order to develop a definition that is vague enough to continue the discussion, Clausewitz’s definition of war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will remains

⁷⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Pamphlet 1: Warfighting*, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1997), 3.

⁷⁵ Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 10 September 2003), vii.

useful. The definition, or understanding, of the term force is what has changed in the new paradigm. Force is no longer the sole providence of the military. Force is now much more broadly defined to include every aspect of national power operating together to accomplish the political objectives. None of the elements of national power can operate independently of the other and still prove successful. Force also includes providing and enforcing a new rule set to govern the actions of both states and non-state actors around the globe. The term force also must account for the positive aspects of force such as assisting in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and other operations of this type. This paper offers the following definition of war: an act of force, using every element of national power in concert with each other, to achieve both positive and negative results in the adversary, thus compelling him to do our will. The important point is that it is crucial that the United States understand and define war for the future. “Arguing about whether an operation constitutes low-, mid-, or high-intensity combat, or if it occurs in peacetime competition, conflict, limited war, or general war really doesn’t matter. Once Americans enter the underdeveloped world, they are at war. It only remains to see who will draw and fire first.”⁷⁶

THE ENVIRONMENT



⁷⁶ Bolger, 99.

Figure 2: Globalization Paradigm's Concept of War and Peace

The fundamental purpose of the military remains the same as it has since the creation of the United States in 1787, namely to protect the state and to accomplish the political objectives assigned to it. The change that is demanded in the Globalization Paradigm stems from the nature of the objectives that will be assigned to the military in the future. “The very notion of ‘national security,’ which these institutions claimed to serve, is being broadened to include not simply military but economic, diplomatic, and even ecological components.”⁷⁷ Much of the conflict around the world revolves around the creation of a new rule set to govern the future globalized world. “Already you can see all over the world struggles emerging over which country, or company, or consumer activist group, or Super-empowered individual is going to be the shaper of various rules or standards-because once you shape a new standard in such a wired world, in such a world without walls, its reach can be enormous.”⁷⁸ States are no longer the sole power concerned with creating and enforcing rule sets around the globe. There are numerous other forces that are concerned with establishing rule sets that are having a direct influence on the conduct of nations around the globe. One such force is international businesses and investors who require that nations abide by certain rules to gain their business and investments.

The concept of war and peace within the Globalization Paradigm is depicted in Figure 2. The axis on the top depicts the previous paradigm’s concept of war and peace. While the threat of large scale state-on-state war has diminished, the threat remains a valid concern for the future that must always be prepared for. The bottom axis depicts the globalizational systems that states will use to maintain security in the future. Peaceful competition in the form of international business, trade, and investment will assist with increasing stability and transparency within the international system. Within the Globalization Paradigm, military forces will be required to

⁷⁷ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 183.

⁷⁸ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 202.

conduct numerous missions that were previously not within their area of expertise. The use of military formations in operations other than large scale state-on-state war is rapidly becoming the rule instead of the anomaly.

The global citizenry will continue to demand that action is taken to end human suffering in all of its forms which will also increase stability to the international system. Crisis response will be conducted to increase stability to elements of the system that need immediate action to resolve problems. Nation assistance will provide states with support for their government and governmental institutions as they face threats to their sovereignty and security from terrorists, insurgents, or other elements. Finally regime change remains an option for rogue states that refuse to accept the rule sets that govern actions within the international system. Most of these globalizational systems are focused on intrastate conflicts and needs with only regime change resulting in interstate conflict. “For globalization is not so much a product or extension of the interstate system as it is a wholly new set of processes, a separate form of world politics, initiated by technologies that have fostered new human needs and wants.”⁷⁹ This is a drastic departure from the previous paradigm where the state was the sole authority within its borders. The spectrum for conflict occurs between peaceful competition and total ideological war. “The dividing line between competition and all-out warfare is admittedly often a little vague.”⁸⁰ The ideological war will occur as states feel that they are losing more and more of themselves because of the demands and effects of the interconnected nature of globalization. “The most common disease of the flat world is going to be multiple identity disorder”⁸¹ as different cultures become

⁷⁹ James N. Rosenau, “Sovereignty in a Turbulent World,” in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 194.

⁸⁰ Creveld, 50.

⁸¹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 201.

increasingly disconnected from the cultures that they come from. A more in depth analysis of these globalizational systems are in the following paragraphs.

“[Globalization] creates new sources of power, beyond the classic military measures of tanks, planes, and missiles, and it creates new sources of pressure on countries to change how they organize themselves, pressures that come not from classic military incursions of one state into another, but rather by more invisible invasions of Supermarkets and Super-empowered individuals.”⁸² Supermarkets and Super-empowered individuals require higher levels of governmental transparency, infringing on the sovereignty of nations, before they will invest in a state. This transparency causes more people to look into the inner-workings of the government, opening many closets that governments would rather remain closed. Further, this transparency, coupled with the ability for information to become global very quickly, can cause the international citizenry to demand action for conflict resolution. “Civil conflicts, economic privation, or political repression can touch off population movements that change domestic attitudes and threaten political stability in other countries.”⁸³

“This process of globalization is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by this new system.”⁸⁴ These people blame the United States in specific, and the western states in general, for the decay of their governmental institutions. Many of these countries are still attempting to overcome hundreds of years of colonial rule and establish viable governmental systems for their people. Many of these states also have corrupt leaders who use their positions in government in order to increase their personal wealth. Many of these people believe that the United States can do more to assist them and blame the United States for

⁸² Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 261.

⁸³ Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty and Intervention,” in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 230.

⁸⁴ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 9.

not providing the much needed assistance that their societies require. This threat “will come from globalization’s disenfranchised, or the losers largely left behind in the states most disconnected from globalization’s advance.”⁸⁵ They can see the benefits of joining the globalizational system, but hold no hope of ever being able to do so.

As the world continues to become more and more interconnected, conflicts will rise in different forms. “All politics isn’t local-not anymore. All politics is now global. Not every country may feel itself part of the globalization system, but every country is directly or indirectly being shaped and affected by this system.”⁸⁶ For countries that are still attempting to throw off the yoke of colonial rule and establish sovereignty over their citizenry and territory, the demands of globalization can become incredibly difficult. “Interdependence, moreover, is as likely to lead to conflict as to cooperation, because states will struggle to escape the vulnerability that interdependence creates, in order to bolster their national security.”⁸⁷ Globalization demands complete openness between states that many times is at direct conflict with the security needs of the citizenry. A good example of this tension is currently going on in the United States as the sale of ports to the United Arab Emirates is seen by some of the political leaders and most of the citizenry as a direct threat to national security. If a sale like this affects the citizenry of the leading proponent of globalization in this manner, one can only guess how a state that is still attempting to establish sovereignty would react. It is very difficult for many states to understand that “when there are no walls to protect you, the only way to protect yourself from internal or external threats is by getting the quality of your own government and oversight up and by building alliances with others to do the same.”⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Barnett, 93.

⁸⁶ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 76.

⁸⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments for Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman, 2000), 27.

⁸⁸ Friedman, 240.

Finally, while states are continuing to establish sovereignty over their citizenry and territory in an attempt to catch up with the leading nations in the world, they will continue to fall further and further behind. The rapid advance of technology and other interconnecting forces will continue to increase the gap between those who are integrated into the system and those who are on the fringes. This will also have an effect on the nature of war. “While the nature of warfare has always shifted over time, the pace of change has escalated immensely given the interconnectedness of the modern world and its saturation with information technology and communication.”⁸⁹ This means that the disparity between military forces will continue to grow in the future. Therefore the United States must be capable of meeting all threats on an equal footing. History has shown that industrial age armies have a difficult time fighting agrarian age armies on their own terrain. It is easy to imagine that this difficulty will be exponentially greater as information age militaries attempt to fight agrarian or industrial age militaries. Much of the difficulty is encapsulated in the different formations required to fight the varying forms of war. But the impact that these other forms of war have on the citizenry is of more vital concern to the future of United States operations internationally in the future. The increased timeframe for the successful accomplishment of political objectives will force either the citizenry to accept the future role of the United States or else demand a return of her troops to the homeland.

OPERATING WITHIN THE GLOBALIZATION PARADIGM

The continued availability of operational information throughout all echelons of the military as well as the general international public will continue to drastically alter United States operations abroad. It remains true that no lower ranking officer is going to be able to start a battle without consent from his superiors, except for the reason of self defense; “the days when only

⁸⁹ Steven Metz, “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval University Press, 2005), 280.

senior officers had the big picture are over.”⁹⁰ Continued discussions about the impact of the “strategic Corporal” will continue as the military, as well as the larger government that he supports, attempts to fully realize the relationship between actions, information, and the consequent changes in perception that result.

The reports and articles from senior commanders returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are continuing to report that war, as previously acknowledged and understood, is no longer simply a matter of exterminating enemy resistance in the area. “Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliance, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people.”⁹¹ Recently the Army as an institution has begun to realize that more knowledge in disparate areas is required to accomplish political objectives. The focus on cultural awareness training, language skills, information operations, infrastructure and other factors are beginning to become more relevant than the maximum effective range of a given weapon system.

As this realization becomes clearer to those elements of national power operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as those who are simply staying attuned to the situation, the systems and bureaucracy that were built to exert force on adversaries is becoming increasingly less capable of operating within the changing paradigm. “This war [the global war on terror] is going to involve a whole lot more than just the Defense Department.”⁹² Operators in Afghanistan and Iraq will continue to be forced to adapt and become more cognizant of the second and third order effects of every operation while simultaneously ensuring that each and every operation includes every agency of the United States, coalition partners, and non-governmental organizations to

⁹⁰ Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, 39.

⁹¹ Robert H. Scales, “The Second Learning Revolution,” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval University Press, 2005), 1.

⁹² Barnett, 95.

provide maximum effect on the target. As stated earlier, the continued discussions about the failure of the intelligence and interagency system are useless to preparing our nation to face future threats. What is required is a completely new understanding of the emerging Globalization Paradigm. This will allow the United States to ensure that the bureaucracy will be prepared to handle threats in the future through careful analysis and restructuring.

The national strategy of the future must take into account the effects of information operations on countering the rise of terrorists in the future before they become threats. Rather than simply creating a new agency to be responsible for strategic communications, the United States needs to include information operations as a cornerstone of every political action in the future. “This is where the primary objective of US national power should be aimed: at convincing the undecided multitudes that becoming part of the global system is a better option than fighting against it.”⁹³ Globalization appears to be taking on a life of its own and is rapidly encompassing the entire planet. It is imperative that the impacts of globalization, both good and bad, are explained to the international community in such a manner as to diffuse the increasing tensions between those who are connected to the system and those who are not.

The nature of the threat must also be carefully analyzed to ensure that the government, and more specifically, the military, is postured to defeat any attacks on United States territory, citizens, or interests around the world. “The future [is] not about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment, but dealing with the environment of threats.”⁹⁴ Despite the political leadership’s desire to return to the “good old days” of worrying about large near-peer enemies, that future operating environment does not appear to have any states prepared to assume this mantle. “In essence, always seeing itself as an instrument of national survival, over time the

⁹³ Andrew Harvey, Ian Sullivan, and Ralph Groves, “A Clash of Systems: An Analytical Framework to Demystify the Radical Islamic Threat,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 2005), 73.

⁹⁴ Barnett, 69.

Army has developed a marked and uncompromising focus on conventional warfighting, leaving it ill-prepared for the unconventional operations that have characterized OIF Phase 4.”⁹⁵ More importantly a realistic glance into the future would show that nation-building and reconstruction operations are becoming the critical missions of the military, and not the anomaly. The leaders of the United States, political and military, must reanalyze the operating environment and prepare the nation to face the most likely threats in the future and not the ones that are comfortable and desired.

INTO THE FUTURE

The world has undergone radical change in the past thirty years and is likely to continue to do so in the future. The United States is discovering that many of the systems developed to provide protection to the citizenry and protect vital national interests abroad are coming under attack for recent failure to provide solutions to problems confronting the nation. These systems, and the supporting bureaucracy, continue to operate as efficiently and effectively as they were intended when initially created. The attacks of September 11th and the subsequent difficulties with nation-building and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are signs that a fundamental change in the system has occurred. This change is not simply a course alteration, but instead a paradigm shift has occurred that is rendering the previous paradigm for analysis of the international system incapable of providing the required framework to adequately view events around the globe.

The impact of globalization on the international system is having profound impacts across every aspect of human interaction. The globalizational trend is causing economies, cultures, information outlets, and states themselves to become increasingly interconnected on a scale never before witnessed. As the interconnected nature of the world continues to develop,

⁹⁵ Aylwin-Foster, 12.

fault lines will develop between those states that are connected to the system and those states that are on the fringes. This will lead to feelings of helplessness and anxiety as those states who are left behind continue to feel disconnected from the world while being bombarded with images of wealth and prosperity from those who are connected to the system.

No single aspect of the advances in technology and information has had as profound an impact across the globe as the continued extension of the internet. “The Internet is the pinnacle of the democratization of information: no one owns the Internet, it is totally decentralized, no one can turn it off, it can potentially reach into every home in the world and many of its key advances were done by collaboration among individuals-many who have never met each other-who worked together over the network, contributing their ideas for free.”⁹⁶ The internet provides a vehicle for like-minded individuals to come together and become more connected despite their state’s inability to do so. Further, “people have the ability to be better connected to things that interest them, to quickly and easily become experts in given subjects and to connect with others who share their interests.”⁹⁷ The problem with this is that feelings of anger and hatred can be shared across the web and can lead to violent acts against those who are prospering under the effects of globalization. The means to conduct these violent acts can be quickly and effectively researched on the net as well, thus making what was previously impossible quite possible. The internet is so powerful a tool that Osama bin Laden single handedly changed the shape of the book world by mentioning a specific book in one of his messages. This action caused the book sales to go from 2,500th to 30th in only twenty-four hours. The power of the internet over the actions of individuals on a global scale is becoming increasingly evident as more human interaction enters the web.

⁹⁶ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 63.

⁹⁷ Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, 154.

While the military continues on a path of transformation, it becomes more important than ever to establish the framework for analysis of the desired transformational aspects of the military. Without a paradigm to guide research and analysis, the chances for making mistakes along the way drastically increase. The crux of the problem is that “if you can’t see the world, and you can’t see the interactions that are shaping the world, you surely cannot strategize about the world.”⁹⁸ This becomes increasingly important as the United States finds itself as the sole remaining superpower in the world with the responsibilities that accompany that status. The primary danger to developing the new paradigm is that “fixation on the characteristics of the moment bring with it the danger that too much significance is ascribed to present circumstances.”⁹⁹ Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the current difficulties in those fledgling democracies are currently center stage. Numerous hypothesis abound on what the true nature of the threat is and how the United States should counter these threats. The current attempts by the military to make previous methods fit the new reality, regardless of whether or not they truly do, is endemic of a complete lack of analysis into the international system as a whole. The military continues to hold on to previous beliefs and rituals, without careful thought being directed toward a holistic view or the international environment. Behind many of the difficulties that the nation is currently having in current operations within the GWOT is a lack of understanding “that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis been finally solved by military power alone.”¹⁰⁰

“While the Clausewitzian paradigm may still be applicable to traditional nation-state – versus nation-state conflicts, we can see that it offers little utility in responding to contingency

⁹⁸ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, 232.

⁹⁹ Dietrich Dörner, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 110.

¹⁰⁰ President John F. Kennedy (remarks to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 7 June 1961), on-line at www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk232_61.html, accessed 25 January 2006.

specific roles, missions, and tasks.”¹⁰¹ The academic community continues to study the changes in war that have resulted from the change in paradigm, but even these analyses only scratch at the surface of the problem. “Alternative concepts for a post-Clausewitzian era should be postulated, as biases and omissions are becoming apparent in the discourse on the relevance of Clausewitzian theory and trinitarian concepts of war.”¹⁰² This is one of the first steps that must be accomplished in order to begin the necessary discussions and analyses to determine if an emergent paradigm is in fact replacing the previous paradigm.

There are numerous indicators that the international system has changed to such a large degree that a new paradigm is required to more accurately reflect the current system. The world has not had a sole super-power since the fall of the Roman Empire. The previous international system was based on events that occurred in Europe leading to the creation of modern nation-states able to operate on an international scale. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union effectively ended the conflict over territories within Europe for the foreseeable future. The central area of conflict shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Africa where crimes against humanity are common and economies are non-existent, except for those who hold the power and their lackeys. With Europe no longer being the focus of conflict, images of the suffering and hardship in other areas of the world have moved to center stage. These images have prompted more and more of the international citizenry to force their governments to act on behalf of the helpless. This means that the government of the United States will increasingly become involved in humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and nation-building operations. The threat from a near-peer competitor in the foreseeable future is negligible. Rather than continuing to force

¹⁰¹ Robert J. Bunker, “Technology in a Neo-Clausewitzian Setting,” in *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy*, ed. Gert de Nooy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 144.

¹⁰² Gert de Nooy, *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 2.

conflicts within the current environment to fit into a previously conceived paradigm, the United States must carefully analyze the situation and reframe the international system.

The effects of Globalization will continue to alter the paradigm that governs human interaction into the future. As Thomas Friedman notes:

“If I am right about the flattening of the world, it will be remembered as one of those fundamental changes – like the rise of the nation-state or the Industrial Revolution – each of which, in its day produced changes in the role of individuals, the role and form of governments, the way we innovated, the way we conducted business, the role of women, the way we fought war, the way we educated ourselves, the way religion responded, the way art was expressed, the way science and research were conducted, not to mention the political labels we assigned to ourselves and to our opponents.”¹⁰³

It is impossible to create a perfect construct for events that will unfold in the future.

However, it is critical that the military develops a framework to analyze warfare in the future. The Army is currently in the middle of large scale transformation while in contact with the enemy. The danger is that the transformations that may be required to successfully accomplish the current objectives assigned may not be the correct requirements in the future. To mitigate risk to the future requirements to national security, it is imperative that the military take a step back and look at all of the factors at work within the world that are shaping the future threat to American security and interests. An analysis of the emergent paradigm is required to ensure that relevant questions are asked and studied to prepare the nation for the future.

¹⁰³ Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, 45-46.

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